Abstract. This paper provides a framework to study the integration of network marketing in a dual-channel distribution system. We develop an approach to optimize the main decision variables of this system simultaneously. These decision variables include the price paid by the customers of both channels, con dence level, the e ort level of active distributors of network marketing, and wholesale price. Although both channels compete with each other, it is vital to have a balanced pricing system to keep them motivated. However, the prices in network marketing and traditional retailer system are not necessarily equal due to the di erences in their nature. Furthermore, it is also required to develop an appropriate system of commissioning for the payo of distributors at di erent levels of network marketing to keep them motivated. We also examine di erent scenarios of dual distribution systems, namely, centralized and decentralized operations of network marketing. Furthermore, in case of decentralized system, we investigate revenue or pro t sharing for all parties involved (manufacturer, retailer, and network marketing distributors). To illustrate the proposed approach, we present some numerical studies and investigate the impact of customer loyalty degree to retail channel on decisions.
Introduction
Network Marketing (NM), as a strategic sales and marketing policy, has recently been gaining popularity in sales and marketing. Typically, it is a sales channel in which a manufacturer directly distributes its product or service to customers through a network of distributors. It is an agile distribution strategy through creating e ective marketing relationship between distributors and customers [1] . The integration of traditional retailing with network marketing adds a new dimension of competition to the distribution channels of a product.
Network marketing seems to be a growing in-requirement and cash ow advantages are other aspects of attractiveness of network marketing. Network marketing provides better control and swift action in product introductions, sales, after-sales services, handling returns, and prompt delivery of goods and services [1] . It also paves the way for maximizing sales volume, market share, and market penetration by close relationship [6] . The cross-cultural characteristic of network marketing channel is an additional strong contributing factor for its widespread success [7] . Furthermore, network marketing is ideal for many people interested in entrepreneurs [7] . There is a relatively rich literature on di erent aspects of two areas related to our work, namely, network marketing [6, 8, 9] and the integration of internet channel with traditional cannel [10] [11] [12] [13] . However, to our knowledge, not many have investigated di erent aspects of network marketing integrated in a distribution system.
To see the studies on di erent aspects of network marketing, such as developing, analyzing, and calibrating the growth of NM, see [6, 8, 9] . The advantages and disadvantages of a distribution system, which includes traditional and internet channel, were investigated in [10, 11, [14] [15] [16] . A hybrid channel, in which customers were classi ed into price-sensitive and service-sensitive segments, was studied by [17] . Cattani provided a survey of channel coordination of the internet-based supply chain with traditional supply chain through procurement, pricing, integration, ful llment, and distribution [14] . Panda showed social responsibility e ect on channel coordination and pro t distribution [18] . C ardenas-Barr on and Sana investigated a productioninventory model for a two-echelon supply chain when demand depended on initiatives of the sales teams [19, 20] . Sana developed an inventory model to determine optimal order quantity of the retailer for homogeneous products based on initiatives of the sales teams [21, 22] .
Pricing and coordination are challenging issues between retailer and the newly added channel as network marketing. Chiang et al. [23] and many others employed a game theory model to study the price competition between direct channel of a manufacturer and its traditional-channel partner. They argued that vertically integrated direct channel allowed a manufacturer to constrain pricing behavior of the retailer partner [16] . Wang et al. investigated pricing and other service decisions of complementary products in a dual-channel supply chain [24] . Roy et al. studied a two-echelon supply chain when demand depended on sales price with random arrival of the customers [25] . Roy et al. showed that dual channels signi cantly in uenced the pricing strategies as well as the e ort level of the supply chain entities and they were always bene cial in an integrated system for the members of the chain [26] . Dual channel pricing and structure in a supply chain was also the focus of study of some researchers [10, 13, [27] [28] [29] [30] .
This paper is distinguished from the other studies in the literature from several aspects.
We develop a novel approach for both centralized and decentralized operations of network marketing in an integrated distribution system. Since the nature of network marketing is di erent from an internet sales channel, the previous results for dual channels are not suitable for analyzing an integrated distribution system which includes network marketing and traditional retailing. In network marketing, in addition to customer price, other parameters such as the number or layers, distributions commissions, and the number of subordinates for each distributor should also be determined; We investigate the impact of complementary coordination based agreements on the pro t of manufacturer, networker marketing channel, and retailers. We develop an approach for creating a coordinated dual channel of network marketing and traditional retailing in order to make it pro table for all members.
From the viewpoint of managerial insight, our approach can assist the companies that are willing to sell their products through network marketing in addition to traditional retailers. Our model makes it possible to determine the best decision to utilize network marketing and traditional sale channels as well as to coordinate them. The coordination of di erent parties involved in a parallel distribution is vital. Otherwise, it may result in a competition which can demotivate some channels.
There are many di erent types of network marketing models in the literature; however, all of them consider some speci ed layers of distributors. In each layer, there are several distributors while each distributor serves certain customers, as shown in Figure 1 . In this gure, for simplicity, only two levels of distributors are depicted, while in reality, a network can have multi levels of distributors.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces problem statement and some related variables such as con dence level and e ort level. Moreover, distributors' commissions and demand function are de ned in this section. In Sections 3, we introduce di erent scenarios for dual channel distribution systems without coordination mechanism. We also analyze the impacts of customer loyalty and commission coe cient on pricing decisions for di erent scenarios. In Section 4, two coordination-based contracts, namely, pro t and revenue sharing contracts, are investigated. Furthermore, we determine the optimal range of coordination parameters. In Section 5, a numerical example is presented. We conclude the results and suggest topics for future research in Section 6.
Problem statement
We consider a manufacturer that distributes its single product through two parallel channels of retailers and network marketing. Customers may choose either channel to purchase the product. Three following distribution scenarios are investigated:
Centralized dual-channel model: Network marketing and traditional channel centrally operated; Decentralized dual-channel model: The manufacturer is the owner of network marketing channel, but not of the traditional one; Fully decentralized dual-channel model: Network marketing and traditional channel decentrally operated.
Con dence level
The important factor that has impact on the sales in network marketing is called con dence level, which refers to customers' perception of the product (or brand). It is achieved through di erent means, such as advertising [16, 27, 31, 32] . If C(g 0 ) represents the cost of having con dence level of g 0 , then C(g 0 ) = 1 g 2 0 2 , where 1 measures the cost e ectiveness of con dence level. The manufacturer (the owner of brand) pays this cost.
E ort level of distributors
The success of network marketing depends on the e ort level of distributors. Let Ef be the average e ort level of a distributor of network marketing to attract and convince customers. If C(Ef) represents the cost of e ort level, Ef, paid by a distributor, then C(Ef) = 2 (Ef) 2 2 , where 2 measures the cost e ectiveness of e ort level. Let represent the probability of sales by a distributor, N n be the number of distributors, and k be the adjustment factor. Accordingly, N n (Ef)k is the expected number of customers attracted by all distributors and N n 2 (Ef) 2 2 is the total cost of e ort paid by the distributors.
Demand functions
We adopt the following demand function, which has been used by many researchers, e.g., see [28, 29, 32] Cross-price sensitivity, which re ects the substitution degree by the other channel; r ; N Demands sensitivity of con dence level in retail channel and network marketing channel, respectively; g 0 Customers' perception of the product (or brand); Ef Average e ort level of a distributor of network marketing to attract and convince customers; 1 Cost e ectiveness of con dence level; 2 Cost e ectiveness of e ort level; N n Number of distributors; Probability of sales by a distributor; c Production cost.
Distributions commissions
Let c N be the commission allocated to the network marketing channel, for each sale, where c is the product cost. Then, the total commissions allocated to the distributors are D N c N .
To see the distribution of the commissions allocated to the distributors of di erent layers, see [33] .
The optimal e ort of distributors
The total pro t of network marketing is as follows:
The rst term of Eq. (3) is the total commissions received for selling D N items, while the second term represents the equivalent cost of e orts by distributors.
Proposition 1. For any given g 0 , the optimal average e ort level in network marketing is as follows:
Proof. Since Eq. (3) is a concave function, we set @ networkers @Ef = 0 and substitute D N from Eq. (2). By updating network marketing demand, based on the optimal e ort (Eq. (4)), it is concluded that the e ort of network marketing distributors raises initial demand as follows:
where N1 = N + N n 2 c N 2 .
Dual channel with no coordination
In this section, we study three di erent scenarios of distribution systems consisting of network marketing and traditional retailers.
Scenario 1, centralized dual-channel model
In this scenario, there are two distribution channels, namely, network marketing and traditional channel, while the manufacturer is the owner of both. The pro t function of the manufacturer in this model is as follows:
where h is handling cost, which includes multiple logistic and storage costs.
Proposition 2. For any given g 0 , the optimal network price and retail price are as follows: p r = A 2r g 0 + B 2r ; 
Optimal value of con dence level
To nd an optimal g 0 that maximizes m , the manufacturer pro t function (Eq. (6)) is rewritten with respect to g 0 , while p r and p N are substituted by Eqs. (7) and (8), respectively. Then, the optimal value of g 0 is as follows: In Appendix C, we show the details of proving @g 0 @ > 0. The other relations can also be proved similarly.
Scenario 2, decentralized dual-channel model
In this scenario, the distribution system consists of traditional and network marketing channels. The manufacturer is the owner of network marketing channel, but not of the traditional one. Similar to the previous scenario, let c N be the commission allocated to the network marketing channel from each sale. The retailer and manufacturer pro t functions are as follows:
; (11) where ! is the wholesale price of each item. From Proposition 1, an optimal e ort level (Eq. (4)) and updated network marketing demand function (Eq. (5)) are determined.
Proposition 5. For a given network price (p N ), wholesale price (!), and con dence level (g 0 ), the optimal retailer price is as follows:
Proof. Retailer pro t function (Eq. (10)) is concave with respect to retailer price, since the second derivative is negative. Therefore, p r is obtained by setting the gradient of pro t function equal to zero.
Proposition 6. For any g 0 , the optimal network marketing price and the wholesale price are as follows: 
Optimal value of con dence level
To nd the optimal g 0 that maximizes m , we set @m @g0 = 0, while p r , p N , and ! are substituted from Eqs. (12)- (14), respectively. Then, the optimal value of g 0 is as follows: In Appendix E, we show the details for proving @g 0 @ < 0 and @P N @ < 0. The other relations can also be proved similarly.
By substituting g 0 from Eq. (15) in Eqs. (12)- (14), the optimal p r , !, and p N are obtained.
Scenario 3, fully decentralized dual-channel model
In this scenario, there are two parallel channels, namely, traditional retailer and network marketing, for distribution. The manufacturer is the owner of neither network marketing channel nor traditional channel.
We apply Stackelberg game model to optimize the system. The manufacturer acts as leader and determines wholesale price as well as con dence level. Moreover, the retailer and network marketing channels act as followers and determine their channel prices at the same time. In addition, the distributors as followers of network marketing channel determine their e ort level. The pro t functions of network marketing channel and manufacturer are as follows:
where NM is network marketing channel pro t. The optimal retailer price is determined as in the previous scenario by Eq. (12) . In order to maximize the pro t of manufacturer and network marketing channel, we propose the following propositions. Proposition 9. For any given retailer price (p r ), wholesale price (!), and con dence level (g 0 ), the optimal network marketing price is as follows:
Proof. Network channel pro t function (Eq. (17)) is concave with respect to its price. Therefore, the network marketing price (p N ) is obtained from @ NM @p N = 0. 
where A 4! and B 4! are de ned in Box I.
Proof. It can be shown that for any g 0 ; pro t function (Eq. (16)) is strictly concave with respect to !. Accordingly, the optimal wholesale price is obtained by setting @m @g0 = 0. Proposition 10 shows that wholesale price is a linear function of con dence level. Furthermore, by increasing con dence level, wholesale price increases, since @! @g 0 > 0. To nd the optimal g 0 that maximizes m , we set @m @g 0 = 0, while p r , p N , and ! are substituted by Eqs. (12) , (18) , and (19), respectively. Then, the optimal value of g 0 is as follows: By substituting g 0 from Eq. (20) in Eqs. (12), (18), and (19), the optimal p r , !, and p N are obtained.
Coordination of decentralized dual-channel system
In this section, decentralized scenario model is reinforced by coordination concepts. We develop revenue (pro t) sharing for the case of decentralized scenario, in which the manufacturer is the owner of network marketing channel, but not of the traditional one. The main idea is that although the retailer and manufacturer share their revenue (pro t), it is pro table for them if their revenue (pro t) is increased. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to enhance the performance of the system. Since the maximal performance of the system is achieved if the system is operated centrally, we set the price of decentralized scenario equal to that of the centralized one. Furthermore, an appropriate whole price is determined in order to maximize the total pro t of the system. It should be noted that in the centralized scenario, the performance of the system is independent of whole price, because the manufacturer is the owner of both channels.
Revenue sharing coordination
In the revenue sharing model, one player lends a portion of their revenue to the other player to make more motivation for coordination. It is assumed that the retailer gives (1 ') percent of their revenue to the manufacturer. Therefore, the coordinated pro t functions of retailer, RS r , and manufacturer, RS m , are updated as follows: As mentioned before, to maximize the system performance, the manufacturer o ers network marketing price and con dence level (g 0 ) equal to those in the centralized scenario. Furthermore, the manufacturer sets wholesale price in order to stimulate retailer to set their order equal to the optimal demand in the centralized scenario. As a result, the retailer price and wholesale price are achieved as follows: (23) and (24), and network marketing price and con dence level equal to those in the centralized scenario. 
A pro t sharing coordination model
In pro t sharing contract, the objective of both players is to agree upon pro t sharing. The prices of the retail channel and network marketing channel, as well as the con dence level and wholesale price, are set equal to the corresponding values in the revenue sharing contract. Afterwards, the extra pro t gained in this model, compared to the decentralized model, is shared among them. It is assumed that the shared ratios of retailer and manufacturer are and (1 ), respectively, where 0 < < 1.
Therefore, pro t functions of retailer and manufacturer in pro t sharing contract are achieved as (25) It is assumed that the retailer's utility function of r is u r , while manufacturer's utility function of m is u m . In this study, analogous to [10] , it is assumed that the two players have equal bargaining capabilities. Thus, Nash bargaining equilibrium model is utilized for determining extra revenue of both players. Consequently, the optimum bargaining result is achieved from optimizing Eq. (26) 
After determining m and r , we can calculate as Eq. (30):
Two players distribute pro t at the end of each time interval according to the contract. Executing this model might face some administrative obstacles, compared to the revenue sharing model. However, in this situation, each player prefers this scenario to the decentralized scenario.
Numerical example
In this section, we present a numerical example to illustrate the theoretical results and explore the di erences between Centralized (C), Decentralized (D), and fully Decentralized (DN) scenarios; see, Figures 2-4 . Moreover, the sensitivity analysis of Revenue Sharing (RS) and Pro t Sharing (PS) is carried out; see Figure 5 . The data for this numerical example is presented in Table 1 .
In Figure 2 (a), the total pro ts of di erent scenarios of C, D, and DN with respect to customer loyalty to retailer channel () are illustrated. It is concluded that the total pro ts of three scenarios are convex with respect to the customer loyalty (). Moreover, it is shown that the centralized model is the dominant option for all levels of customer loyalty (). Additionally, for < 1 , the decentralized scenario (D) is preferred to fully decentralized scenario (DN). However, if > 1 , this preference becomes reverse. Figure 2(b) shows that retailer price increases by increasing the customer loyalty to retailer channel, whereas network marketing price has reverse behavior with respect to customer loyalty, Propositions 4 and 8. Figure 2 (c) shows that by increasing customer loyalty to retailer channel, con dence level in centralized scenario increases, whereas in the decentralized model (D), it decreases. In addition, it is seen that con dence level in fully decentralized model (DN) is independent of customer loyalty. Probability of sales ( ) is an important parameter in network marketing. Thus, we investigate its e ect on the results. In the following, the probability of sales changes in the range of [0.0-0.4] and customer loyalty is xed at = 0:4; other parameters are as in Table 2 .
According to Figure 3(a) , when probability of sales ( ) increases, the total pro t also increases for all scenarios. Moreover, Figure 3(b) shows that network marketing and retailer prices as well as wholesale price are increasing functions of probability of sales ( ), while network marketing price is more sensitive. In addition, con dence level and e ort level increase by increasing probability of sales ( ), which means that lager probability of sales ( ) motivates distributors in network marketing to work more. It is another expression of Proposition 1.
In the following, we perform sensitivity analysis of the commission coe cient. It changes in the range of [0.1-0.5] and customer loyalty is xed at = 0:4; other parameters are as in Table 1 . Figure 4 (a) shows that the total pro t in all scenarios is increasing function of commission coe cient ( N ). Moreover, according to Figure 4 , by increasing commission coe cient ( N ), channel prices as well as wholesale and e ort levels also increase. It is a con rmation of Propositions 4 and 8. Figure 5 (a) shows that '; ' are decreasing functions of customer loyalty () within the interval. Moreover, Figure 5 (b) shows that is more sensitive than to .
For the numerical example, sensitivity analysis of total pro t in di erent scenarios versus the important parameters such as customer loyalty to retailer channel (), commission coe cient ( N ), and probability of sale ( ) is presented in Tables 2 and 3 . Amounts of these parameters in uence distribution channel architecture.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a framework to study the integration of network marketing into a distribution system. Network marketing enforces the sales e ort by increasing the motivation of distributors. Consequently, motivated distributors increase their e ort level to attract more customers. As endorsement, in all scenarios, the total pro t of system was an increasing function of commission coe cient ( N ).
Moreover, the results showed that training the distributors could increase the performance of distribution system through raising the probability of sales ( ), which increased the pro t function of system.
The results showed that in dual channel with no coordination, centralized scenario was the most pro table among all scenarios; however, this might not be applicable to all cases. Moreover, decentralized scenario made more pro t than the fully decentralized scenario in normal situation. Furthermore, there was a threshold of customer loyalty degree to retailer channel () that made fully decentralized scenario preferred to decentralized scenario.
Coordination-based scenarios as well as revenue and pro t sharing contracts improved the performance of decentralized scenario. The total pro t of distribution system in these coordination-based contracts could attain the maximum level, similar to centralized scenario. We also proved that pro t or revenue sharing contract was accepted within some speci ed ranges of ' and , as presented in Propositions 11 and 12.
Our analysis might have some limitations. We assumed that all information was known and demand was deterministic.
Therefore, this research can be extended in several directions in future work. First, for uncertain data, some uncertainty approaches can be applied to make it more realistic; second, we can consider random demand instead of deterministic demand; third, internet channel can be included as the third channel of distribution system; fourth, other types of network marketing can be chosen as base model for analyzing; and the last, but not the least, the dynamic pricing of retailer and network channel is also a subject worthy of further investigation. Proof of Proposition 4
From Eq. 
